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I. INTRODUCTION

Home is where the heart is. Or maybe home is where state income
tax is nonexistent. Or maybe home is where a smorgasbord of presumptions,
sub-rules, and twenty-six factors say it is.

*
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Where your home is—i.e., where you are defined to be a resident—
has tax consequences. A state may tax a resident’s global income, meaning
the state may tax income earned in any state or foreign country.1 In contrast,
if a person is a non-resident, the state may only tax the person’s income
earned within the state, also known as source income.2 For the most part,
residency is an all-or-nothing game.
States generally define residency based on domicile, the number of
days lived in a state, place of abode, or a blend of each.3 In Minnesota, a
resident is either a person domiciled in Minnesota, or a person who spends at
least half the year in Minnesota and “maintains a place of abode” there, also
known as the physical-presence test.4 The physical-presence test provides a
bright-line rule for determining residency. Domicile does not.
This article addresses Minnesota’s amorphous domicile rule, which
is codified in Minnesota Rule 8001.0300. Current application of the rule is
anything but principled—or simple. There are too many sub-rules and
presumptions, and the 26-factor “test” is unwieldy. Many of the sub-rules
simply restate the domicile definition or capture circumstances better left to a
factor analysis. In other words, many of the sub-rules are unnecessary and
confusing to the process. The presumptions, other than the continuingdomicile presumption, are superfluous and are best recast as factors. Finally,
the current factor test provides no guidance on what factors should be
considered more determinative of a person’s domicile, even though common
sense recognizes that some factors better signify a person’s domicile. This
article’s proposal attempts to remedy Rule 8001.0300’s unprincipled
approach to determining domicile.
This article proposes a redraft of Rule 8001.0300. As part of this
redraft, it contends that Minnesota needs to take a principled, structured
approach when applying the twenty-six factors it uses to identify a person’s
domicile by using a hierarchical categorization of factors. In addition, it
advocates recharacterizing three of the four presumptions as factors, leaving
only the continuing-domicile presumption intact. Finally, it recommends
striking most of the sub-rules that clutter Rule 8001.0300, because many of
them flow from the definition of domicile or restate circumstances already

1
See Aaishah Hashmi, Is Home Really Where The Heart Is?: State Taxation of
Domiciliaries, Statutory Residents, and Nonresidents in the District of Columbia, 65 TAX
LAW. 797, 801–02 (2012) (summarizing states’ power, under the United States Constitution,
to tax resident income).
2
See id. at 802–03 (summarizing states’ power, under the United States
Constitution, to tax non-resident income).
3
See RICHARD REICHLER, STATE TAXATION OF COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
§ 1750.03 (2012).
4
MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7 (2012); see also MINN. R. 8001.0300 (2013).
Certain exceptions apply to these definitions, such as military status and reciprocity
provisions. MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7. For this article, exceptions are ignored because of
their limited application.
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captured by the factors. In other words, most of the sub-rules add nothing to
a domicile analysis.
Part II will look at Minnesota’s residency law, with a primary focus
on the definition of domicile. Parts III, IV, and V will examine Minnesota’s
application of its domicile rule, which will provide a glimpse into the murky
world of domicile disputes. Part III will take a critical look at the
presumptions that infest Rule 8001.0300 and will offer suggestions for
trimming down the presumptions by recharacterizing three of the four
presumptions as factors. Part IV will contend that a hierarchical
categorization of the twenty-six factors is needed. Through categorization,
factors that are qualitatively more important than others will be given their
proper weight, while those of less importance will be used as tiebreakers.
Part V will suggest that certain sub-rules be struck. Suggestions focus on
eliminating sub-rules that are nothing more than the domicile definition
applied to specific circumstances or that simply repeat factors already
considered in the factor analysis.
Part VI will lay out the proposed redraft of Rule 8001.0300. The
redraft emerges from this article’s discussion of the problems with the
current rule. The redraft, however, retains much of the current rule,
particularly those portions that are peripheral to the core issues that normally
arise in domicile disputes.
The redraft will not inject perfect predictability into domicile
disputes. Determining a person’s domicile is often an unpredictable
undertaking. But the redraft will produce a more principled, structured
approach to resolving domicile disputes and will impose more order on the
process.
II. MINNESOTA RESIDENCY LAW
In Minnesota, for tax purposes, a person is a Minnesota resident if he
meets either of two conditions. First, a person who resides in the state for
half the year and maintains a place of abode in Minnesota is a Minnesota
resident.5 Second, a person domiciled in Minnesota is a resident.6
This article addresses the second test—domicile. The first test,
physical presence, provides a bright-line rule. Domicile, in contrast, involves
consideration of a number of sub-rules, presumptions, and factors.7 These
considerations are meant to “guide” courts to a conclusion. Unfortunately,
Rule 8001.0300’s overlapping presumptions, sub-rules, and factors have led
to unprincipled, or at least somewhat indecipherable, applications of the rule.

5
6
7

MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7; MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 1.
MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7; MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 1.
See MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2–subp. 3.
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Rule 8001.0300 defines domicile in two ways.8 First, it defines
domicile to mean “the bodily presence of an individual person in a place
coupled with an intent to make such a place one’s home.”9 This definition
involves two prongs. First, the person must have a bodily presence in the
state claimed to be his domicile.10 Second, that bodily presence must be
coupled with an intent to make that state his home.11 It is unclear whether
“coupled” means that intent and bodily presence must be simultaneous in
every circumstance.12 But Minnesota courts will “examine more than simply
acts occurring at the time of and shortly after the taxpayer’s physical move to
another state” when determining whether a taxpayer intended to change his
domicile.13 Courts will look both to actions at the time of the stated intention
to move and to acts and circumstances of the taxpayer’s life after that date
“to evaluate ‘the sincerity of [his] announced intent.’”14
Rule 8001.0300 also defines a person’s domicile as the “place in
which that person’s habitation is fixed, without any present intentions of
removal therefrom, and to which, whenever absent, that person intends to
return.”15
When determining whether a person has changed domicile, intent is
key.16 However, there is no positive rule for determining intent.17 Rather, the
rule requires courts to look to “acts and declarations” for proof of intent, and
it further instructs that “of the two forms of evidence, acts must be given
more weight than declarations.”18
8
Id., subp. 2. Courts treat these definitions as equivalent. Larson v. Comm’r of
Revenue, 824 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Minn. 2013) [hereinafter Larson II].
Domicile means “that place in which [a] person’s habitation is fixed,
without any present intentions of removal therefrom, and to which,
whenever absent, that person intends to return.” To be domiciled, one
must have “bodily presence . . . in a place coupled with an intent to make
such a place one’s home.”
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
9
MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Sanchez v. Comm’r of Revenue, 770 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Minn. 2009) (“We
need not decide whether presence and intent must be simultaneous under every possible
scenario.”); cf. MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2 (“The mere intention to acquire a new domicile,
without the fact of physical removal, does not change the status of the taxpayer, nor does the
fact of physical removal, without the intention to remain, change the person’s status.”).
13
Larson II, 824 N.W.2d at 332.
14
Id. at 333 (alteration in original) (quoting Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d at 526).
15
MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2. While these two definitions are rephrasings of
the same concept, the final phrase in the second definition, “to which, whenever absent, that
person intends to return,” can cause problems when courts must contend with an agreement
between the parties that the taxpayer never intended to return to Minnesota, while also dealing
with the continuing-domicile presumption. See infra Part III.A (describing how the
continuing-domicile presumption trumped the basic definition of domicile).
16
See MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2.
17
Id.
18
Id.
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Rule 8001.0300 contains not only the definition of domicile, but also
a number of presumptions, sub-rules, and factors meant to guide a court to a
decision. The remaining parts of this article will take a critical look at these
“guides” and will lay out a proposed redraft of Minnesota’s domicile rule.
III. PERUSING THE PRESUMPTIONS
Rule 8001.0300 contains the following rebuttable presumptions:
(1) once a place is shown to be a person’s domicile, it continues to be that
person’s domicile until the contrary is shown (“continuing-domicile
presumption”);19 (2) the place where a person’s family is domiciled is that
person’s domicile (“family-domicile presumption”);20 (3) a person’s
domicile is the place where one lives (“where-you-live presumption”);21 and
(4) a person who leaves Minnesota to accept employment in a foreign nation
has not lost that person’s domicile in Minnesota (“foreign-employment
negative presumption”).22
These presumptions are meant to guide courts in determining a
person’s domicile. But, for the most part, the presumptions capture many of
the same circumstances that are also captured by the twenty-six factors.23 In
contrast to the factors, however, presumptions carry more power on their
own. Therefore, presumptions should be used sparingly.
This part takes a critical look at each presumption. It proposes
retaining only the continuing-domicile presumption and striking the familydomicile presumption, the where-you-live presumption, and the foreignemployment negative presumption. These latter three presumptions address
circumstances better left to the factor analysis.
A. Continuing-Domicile Presumption
Under Rule 8001.0300, once a place is shown to be a person’s
domicile, it continues to be that person’s domicile until the contrary is
shown.24 The continuing-domicile presumption is the only presumption kept
by the proposed redraft of Rule 8001.0300. This presumption is built on

19

Id.
Id. People covered by the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 are
not included under this presumption. Id.
21
MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2.
22
Id. (stating that “[a]n absence of intention to abandon a domicile is equivalent
to an intention to retain the existing one”).
23
See infra Part III.B–D (describing how circumstances captured in the familydomicile presumption, the where-you-live presumption, and the foreign-employment negative
presumption are also captured by factors).
24
MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2.
20
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practical considerations, and it recognizes “[d]omicile is not something either
easily abandoned or accidentally changed.”25
The continuing-domicile presumption often has determinative effect,
even if the taxpayer fails to meet the definition of a domiciliary in the state
that has the presumption in its favor, as shown by Sanchez v. Commissioner
of Revenue.26 Therefore, courts should use caution when applying it.
In Sanchez, the continuing-domicile presumption controlled even
though a husband and wife ceased to meet the basic definition of Minnesota
domiciliaries. In Sanchez, all parties agreed that the couple never intended to
return to Minnesota after they sold their home and left the state.27 But
because the couple failed to rebut the continuing-domicile presumption, by
failing to prove establishment of a new domicile, they were ruled to have
continued their Minnesota domicile.28
The dispute centered on whether the couple had established a new
domicile in South Dakota.29 All parties agreed that the couple left Minnesota
with no intent to return when they sold their Minnesota home. But the tax
court framed the issue as whether the couple had met their burden to prove
that they had established a new domicile in South Dakota, as required by the
continuing-domicile presumption, after they sold their home.30
Before the couple sold their home in Minnesota, they took steps to
establish their domicile in South Dakota.31 The couple hired a South Dakota
company that provided mail-forwarding and vehicle-registration services.32
This hire allowed the couple to register their two vehicles in South Dakota,
apply for South Dakota driver’s licenses, open a checking account and obtain
credit cards from a bank in South Dakota, and register to vote in South
Dakota.33 They also notified their insurance company of their new South
Dakota address.34 All this activity, however, took place before the couple
sold their Minnesota residence, which was the date all parties agreed that the
couple “extinguished their domicile in Minnesota and left the State once and
for all.”35 The couple never rented or owned a home in South Dakota, nor did
they spend any time in South Dakota after the sale of their Minnesota
residence.36 Rather, the couple traveled the United States by motor home
25

Sarek v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 2524, 1979 WL 1107, at *5 (Minn. Tax Ct.
Apr. 19, 1979) (citation omitted).
26
Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d 523.
27
Id. at 526.
28
Sanchez v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 7910, 2008 WL 8679077, at *5 (Minn.
Tax Ct. Oct. 9, 2008).
29
Id. at *1.
30
Id. at *3.
31
Id. at *2.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Sanchez, 2008 WL 8679077, at *2.
35
Id. at *3.
36
Id. at *2–3.
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during the remainder of the tax year at issue.37 The couple did state in an
affidavit that they intended to return to South Dakota to rent or buy a home
after their travel, but did not do so initially because they wanted to avoid the
expenses and obligations of home ownership.38
Their stated intent was not enough, and their failure to couple
physical presence with intent had unpleasant tax consequences for the
husband and wife. In concluding that the couple failed to prove that they had
established a new domicile in South Dakota, the tax court noted that all
actions taken by the couple that allegedly demonstrated their intent to
domicile in South Dakota took place before they had extinguished their
domicile in Minnesota.39 In essence, the husband and wife failed to couple
their physical presence in South Dakota with their intent to make South
Dakota their new home.40 As such, the husband and wife failed to prove that
they had established a new domicile in South Dakota and, therefore, failed to
rebut the presumption that their domicile continued in Minnesota.41
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the tax court’s ruling.42 The
supreme court “‘stressed that a party does not need to prove abandonment of
present domicile, but, instead rebut[] the presumption that he or she has not
changed domicile by proving establishment of domicile in another
jurisdiction.’”43 The supreme court agreed with the tax court that the husband
and wife had failed to establish the necessary coupling between physical
presence in South Dakota and intent to make South Dakota their home,
which, according to the supreme court, was required in order to find that the
husband and wife had established a new domicile in South Dakota.44
Accordingly, the court held that the couple continued to be Minnesota
domiciliaries, even though the husband and wife each failed to meet the basic
definition of a Minnesota domiciliary.45

37

Id. at *2.
Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d at 525.
39
Sanchez, 2008 WL 8679077, at *4.
40
Id.
41
Id. at *5. The tax court explained:
Where Appellants retained the services of a South Dakota mail forwarding
business and obtained drivers licenses and registered to vote in South
Dakota before, but admit their Minnesota domicile continued until after,
they sold their house here, the Commissioner correctly determined that
Appellants failed to overcome the presumption they remained domiciled
in Minnesota. Although they declared their intent to change their
domicile, they failed to return to South Dakota after leaving Minnesota,
much less to integrate themselves into a new domicile.
38

Id.

42

Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d at 524.
Id. at 526 (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Sandberg v. Comm’r
of Revenue, 383 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Minn. 1986)).
44
Id. at 527.
45
See id. at 526–28.
43
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Page asserted that the majority’s
holding would require future taxpayers to buy or rent property in the state
they wished to establish a new domicile in and “remain physically present in
that state for some undefined period of time.”46 In other words, taxpayers
would have to “shackle” themselves to their new state.47 To the dissent, the
actions taken by the couple were “not actions that a taxpayer would
undertake merely to create an illusion of changing domicile.”48 Those
actions, according to the dissent, along with the couple having no intent to
return to Minnesota, were enough to show the couple’s intent to make South
Dakota their permanent home.49
Sanchez illustrates the power of the continuing-domicile
presumption: it can trump even the basic definition of domicile. Even if a
taxpayer proves he never intends to return to his old domicile, thus failing to
meet the basic definition of a domiciliary, he will still be considered a
domiciliary of his old state until he can prove establishment of a new
domicile. Though harsh, the continuing-domicile presumption is practical.
Someone has to bear the burden of proving that a new domicile has been
established.50 And unlike an “abandonment” test, the continuing-domicile
presumption ensures that a person always has a domicile. With an
abandonment test, a taxpayer could prove abandonment of their old domicile
but not prove establishment of a new domicile, leaving the taxpayer in
domicile limbo. The continuing-domicile presumption avoids this
unworkable result.51
Moreover, the presumption acts as a smoking-out tool. The taxpayer,
often being the one claiming a new domicile, has better access to evidence to
46

Id. at 528 (Page, J., dissenting).
Id.
48
Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d at 528 (Page, J., dissenting).
49
Id.
50
Theoretically, the commissioner of revenue could claim that the taxpayer
established a new domicile in Minnesota. If so, the commissioner would then have to rebut the
continuing-domicile presumption. However, of all the cases reviewed for this article, not one
case focused on the commissioner’s attempt to prove establishment of a new domicile in
Minnesota. Instead, the taxpayer has been attempting to prove establishment of a new
domicile outside of Minnesota, and the commissioner has claimed either that the taxpayer is
still a Minnesota domiciliary or that the taxpayer has failed to rebut the continuing-domicile
presumption.
51
A similar rationale for the continuing-domicile presumption has been judged
necessary for resolving diversity-jurisdiction disputes:
The rule from which this presumption is derived—that a domicile once
established continues unless and until a new one is shown . . . to have
been acquired—represents the conflicts of law solution to the problem of
locating the domicile of an individual who clearly has pulled up stakes
with the intention of abandoning his present domicile, but either has not
arrived physically at a new one or has arrived but has not yet formulated
an intention to remain there for the indefinite future.
13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3612 (3d ed.
2013).
47
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demonstrate acts and circumstances that prove his new domicile, besides his
mere declarations. With the presumption often pushing against him, the
taxpayer has an incentive to keep adequate records so he can prove that he
established a new domicile.52
In sum, while not perfect, the continuing-domicile presumption
delivers sufficient utility to a domicile analysis, unlike the other
presumptions. Therefore, it is the only presumption kept by the proposed
redraft of Rule 8001.0300.
B. Family-Domicile Presumption
The presumption that the place where the taxpayer’s family is
domiciled is also the taxpayer’s domicile sets up double counting when
family connections are involved in a domicile analysis: one for the
presumption and one for the consideration of family ties in the factor
analysis.53 This is unfair and unnecessary. Taxpayers have had a difficult
time proving establishment of a new domicile, regardless of the familydomicile presumption.54 Ridding the rules of this presumption will not make
the task easier, nor will it suddenly lead to swarms of people escaping
Minnesota’s domicile definition.
While not as prevalent as the continuing-domicile presumption, the
family-domicile presumption is applied occasionally.55 Even when not
applied, where a person’s family is located still has an effect on a court’s
decision.56 So regardless of whether a court mentions the presumption,
family ties carry weight. Therefore, because Rule 8001.0300 is already full
of guidance on determining domicile, and because Minnesota courts already
emphasize where a person’s family is located, the proposed redraft strikes
the family-domicile presumption.

52
See MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 5. The rule already requires that a person, who
is domiciled outside of Minnesota and who claims to be a non-resident, to have “available for
examination adequate records to substantiate that more than one-half of the tax year was spent
outside Minnesota.” This presumption, at least implicitly, extends that requirement to those
who claim not to have retained their Minnesota domicile.
53
See infra Part IV.C (describing how family ties affect the factor analysis).
54
See, e.g., Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d 523; Mauer v. Comm’r of Revenue, 829
N.W.2d 59 (Minn. 2013); Manthey v. Comm’r of Revenue, 468 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1991).
55
See Dreyling v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 7721-R, 2007 WL 4088814, at *8
(Minn. Tax Ct. Nov. 15, 2007) (concluding that the husband-taxpayer had failed to rebut the
presumption that his domicile remained the same as his spouse’s Minnesota domicile);
Morrissey v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 4866, 1988 WL 91653, at *8 (Minn. Tax Ct. Aug. 15,
1988) [hereinafter Morrissey II] (concluding that the taxpayer-husband had overcome
presumption that one’s home is where one’s family is domiciled).
56
See infra Part IV.C (describing how family ties affect the factor analysis).
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C. Where-You-Live Presumption
Another presumption that is struck from the proposed redraft is the
presumption that you are domiciled where you live.57 In domicile disputes,
where one lives is the sole issue. Individuals often have multiple residences
in multiple states, meaning they “live” in multiple states. So the where-youlive presumption adds little to a domicile analysis.
Further, the presumption involves double counting. Certain factors
already address where a person lives, so there is no need to pile on a
presumption.58 Thus, the presumption that “one’s domicile is the place where
one lives” is struck from the proposed redraft of Rule 8001.0300. In its place,
the proposed hierarchical categorization of the twenty-six factors will better
capture where one truly “lives.”
D. Foreign-Employment Negative Presumption
Finally, the presumption that a person has not lost their domicile
merely because they accepted a job assignment in a foreign nation is also
struck from the proposed redraft. Location of employment is already a
factor.59 So, once again, the current rule is double counting a particular
circumstance. Therefore, the proposed redraft strikes this presumption. But
to reflect the skepticism shown by courts towards those who claim foreign
domiciles,60 the proposed redraft places the factor concerning location of
employment in category one of the new hierarchical factor analysis.
IV. NOT ALL FACTORS ARE CREATED EQUAL
Besides presumptions, Rule 8001.0300 also lists twenty-six factors
that should be considered when determining a person’s domicile.61 This
57

See MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2.
See id., subp. 3 (listing factors that relate to living arrangements, which include
“F. location of newly acquired living quarters whether owned or rented” and “G. present
status of the former living quarters, i.e., whether it was sold, offered for sale, rented, or
available for rent to another”).
59
Id., subp. 3(E).
60
See Setness v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 5261, 1989 WL 146003, at *9 (Minn.
Tax Ct. Nov. 30, 1989) (concluding that the taxpayer had not established a new domicile in
Saudi Arabia); Larson v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 4909, 1988 WL 91652, at *6 (Minn. Tax
Ct. Aug. 19, 1988) (concluding that the taxpayer had not transferred his domicile to Germany
when he accepted temporary employment there).
61
Minn. R. 8001.0300, subp. 3. The factors are:
A. location of domicile for prior years; B. where the person votes or is
registered to vote, but casting an illegal vote does not establish domicile
for income tax purposes; C. status as a student; D. classification of
employment as temporary or permanent; E. location of employment; F.
location of newly acquired living quarters whether owned or rented; G.
present status of the former living quarters, i.e., whether it was sold,
58
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26-factor list is nonexclusive62; no factor is determinative63; and,
interestingly, charitable contributions made by a person cannot be
considered.64 Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected attempts
“to elevate the importance of one factor over another” or to determine
domicile by counting factors.65 In other words, the “test” is not a test.66
Rather, it’s a mess—ripe for abuse.67
offered for sale, rented, or available for rent to another; H. whether
homestead status has been requested and/or obtained for property tax
purposes on newly purchased living quarters and whether the homestead
status of the former living quarters has not been renewed; I. ownership of
other real property; J. jurisdiction in which a valid driver’s license was
issued; K. jurisdiction from which any professional licenses were issued;
L. location of the person’s union membership; M. jurisdiction from which
any motor vehicle license was issued and the actual physical location of
the vehicles; N. whether resident or nonresident fishing or hunting
licenses purchased; O. whether an income tax return has been filed as a
resident or nonresident; P. whether the person has fulfilled the tax
obligations required of a resident; Q. location of any bank accounts,
especially the location of the most active checking account; R. location of
other transactions with financial institutions; S. location of the place of
worship at which the person is a member; T. location of business
relationships and the place where business is transacted; U. location of
social, fraternal, or athletic organizations or clubs or in a lodge or country
club, in which the person is a member; V. address where mail is received;
W. percentage of time (not counting hours of employment) that the person
is physically present in Minnesota and the percentage of time (not
counting hours of employment) that the person is physically present in
each jurisdiction other than Minnesota; X. location of jurisdiction from
which unemployment compensation benefits are received; Y. location of
schools at which the person or the person’s spouse or children attend, and
whether resident or nonresident tuition was charged; and Z. statements
made to an insurance company, concerning the person’s residence, and on
which the insurance is based.
Id.

62

Sanchez, 2008 WL 8679077, at *2.
MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 3.
64
MINN. STAT. § 290.01, subd. 7(c); MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 3.
65
See Dreyling v. Comm’r of Revenue, 711 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn. 2006)
[hereinafter Dreyling I] (rejecting both the “attempt to elevate the importance of one factor
over another” and the notion that “the sheer quantity of factors favoring nondomiciliary status
outweighs the factors favoring domicile in Minnesota”). In Mauer v. Commissioner of
Revenue, the Minnesota Supreme Court reiterated its rejection of an approach that determines
domicile by counting factors. 829 N.W.2d at 69 (citing Dreyling I, 711 N.W.2d at 495). The
court then contradicted itself by proceeding to count factors. See id. at 70–74.
66
Minnesota Supreme Court Justice G. Barry Anderson agrees: “a 26-factor
domicile test is no test at all. . . . [T]he current approach to domicile by the Commissioner is
hardly ‘common sense.’” Id. at 78 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
67
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently acknowledged this potential for
abuse:
[W]e acknowledge and agree with the dissent’s desire to convey to both
the Commissioner and the tax court that they must strive to apply the
Department’s factors in a consistent and equitable manner. For taxpayers
to have trust and confidence that Minnesota’s tax system is fairly and
63
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This part attempts to remedy that mess by proposing a categorization
of factors into three hierarchical categories. Proper use of this new
categorization will require focusing first—and solely—on category-one
factors. These factors represent circumstances that best reflect a person’s
domicile. If focus on category one does not lead to a conclusion, then
category two should be consulted. If after consultation, a domicile still
cannot be pinned down, then category three should be used as a tiebreaker,
by counting category-three factors.
To help categorize factors, rather than exhaustively analyze each
factor individually, this part highlights the weight Minnesota courts have
placed on certain factors. Courts claim that one factor should not be elevated
over another, but their rulings suggest otherwise, as they appear to implicitly
favor some factors over others.68 And in some cases, this favoritism appears
more explicitly.
Besides relying on case-law guidance, the hierarchical categorization
also takes a common-sense approach to categorizing factors. For example, a
person’s real-property connections to a state should carry more weight than a
person’s bank-account connections. Simply put, not all factors are created
equal.
A. “Living Quarters”: Owned or Rented, Big House or Little House
Numerous factors address “living quarters.”69 The nature and value
of a person’s home or homes appear to carry considerable weight in a
domicile analysis, and the absence of any home in a state may destroy any
claim that a new domicile has been established. In Sanchez, both the
Minnesota Tax Court and Minnesota Supreme Court were disturbed by the
couple’s lack of residence in South Dakota, the claimed new domicile.70
Even though the couple never intended to return to Minnesota and had
established some connections to South Dakota, they neither rented nor
owned any residence in South Dakota.71 This seemed fatal to their claim that
they had established a new domicile in South Dakota.
While Justice Page, in his dissent, challenged the court’s focus on
the couple’s failure to establish a residence in South Dakota,72 this focus is
reasonable in light of the basic definition of domicile. Domicile is defined, in
equitably applied to all, it is vitally important that taxpayers be able to
understand the Department’s factors and how those factors are applied in
any given situation. Such an understanding is important so that taxpayers
can adjust their expectations, intentions, and actions accordingly.
Mauer, 829 N.W.2d at 76 n.2.
68
See infra Part IV.A–D (describing how the courts appear to implicitly place
more weight on some factors as compared to others).
69
MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 3(F)–(H).
70
See Sanchez, 2008 WL 8679077, at *4; Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d at 527.
71
See Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d at 524–27.
72
See id. at 528 (Page, J., dissenting).
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part, as the “place in which a person’s habitation is fixed.”73 Fixed does not
necessarily mean a real-property connection to a state, but it means more
than a transient connection. It means that some type of habitation has been
established, even if minimally. Therefore, it is reasonable for a court to place
significant weight on whether a person has established living quarters in the
state claimed to be that person’s domicile.
But it is not just the mere establishment of living quarters that draws
a court’s attention. Minnesota courts also look to whether the taxpayer rents
or owns their living quarters. In Morrissey v. Commissioner of Revenue, the
tax court ruled against a taxpayer who claimed that he was an Indiana
domiciliary.74 The court found it significant that the taxpayer neither owned
nor rented real property in Indiana.75 Instead, the taxpayer “merely had a
room at an Indiana motel, a type of living arrangement typically transient and
temporary.”76
Minnesota courts also look to the home’s value. In Page v.
Commissioner of Revenue, the tax court ruled that the taxpayer had
established a new domicile in Illinois, even while retaining numerous
contacts with Minnesota.77 The court placed significant weight on the home
purchased by the taxpayer in Illinois: “The home selected in Chicago was a
spacious, expensive, designer furnished, home that [the taxpayer]
characterized as a dream house—hardly the type of accommodations one
would seek for a temporary stay.”78
Home value also played a significant role in Stamp v. Commissioner
of Revenue. In Stamp, the tax court ruled against taxpayers seeking to claim
Florida as their new domicile.79 Weighing heavily in that decision was the
lack of investment in the taxpayers’ Florida home.80 The court viewed the
real-estate investment as insubstantial considering the taxpayers’ annual
income and expected tax savings if Florida was their domicile.81
These cases show that ownership versus rental of living quarters and
the value of living quarters are significant considerations when determining
domicile. It also illustrates the general focus that Minnesota courts direct at
real estate in domicile disputes, as they seemingly place substantial weight
on real-estate connections and the circumstances surrounding those

73

MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2.
Morrissey v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 4275, 1985 WL 6220, at *7 (Minn. Tax.
Ct. Dec. 17, 1985).
75
Id. at *6.
76
Id.
77
Page v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 4011, 1986 WL 15695, at *3 (Minn. Tax Ct.
Mar. 12, 1986).
78
Id. at *6.
79
Stamp v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 2572, 1979 WL 1117, at *3 (Minn. Tax Ct.
June 27, 1979).
80
Id. at *5.
81
Id.
74
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connections. As such, of the twenty-six factors, those that relate to living
quarters are placed in category one.
Despite the focus on owning real estate and the value of that real
estate in the cases referenced above, it is important to note that the value of
the home or whether a person is renting or owning may not be as significant
when the economics of the taxpayer’s situation restricts the value of their
home or their ability to own. In Morrissey II, the tax court concluded that,
although a newly rented home was humble, the taxpayer “should not be
penalized because he lived in a rooming house or apartment rather than an
expensive home.”82 In Morrissey II, because of the realities of the taxpayer’s
economic circumstances, the court did not penalize the taxpayer’s lack of
ownership or value in the property.83
Morrissey II suggests that, at least with respect to taxpayers of
modest means, the focus on home value and ownership may not be as
critical. But for taxpayers with a high net worth, whether they choose to rent
or buy expensive homes will carry considerable weight. In sum, courts
will—and should—place substantial weight on the nature and value of a
person’s home or homes, taking into account the person’s financial situation.
B. Nature of Employment
The nature of the taxpayer’s employment in a state also carries
significant weight in a domicile analysis. Manthey v. Commissioner of
Revenue provides a forceful demonstration.84 In Manthey, the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld the tax court’s ruling that the taxpayer had not
changed his domicile to Alaska.85 The taxpayer had moved to Alaska to work
on various construction projects related to the Alaskan pipeline.86 His wife
and children remained in Minnesota and were financially supported by him.87
While the taxpayer maintained other connections to Minnesota and accepted
some benefits accorded to Minnesota residents, most of his time was spent in
Alaska.88 Moreover, he “enjoyed certain rights peculiar to Alaskan citizens
and established social and fraternal relations there.”89 These seemingly
strong connections to Alaska, however, were not enough to sway the court,
as the temporary nature of the taxpayer’s employment in Alaska helped
destroy his claim that he was domiciled there.
The court noted that the taxpayer intended to remain in Alaska only
so long as he could work: “When work ran out . . . [he] returned to
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Morrissey II, 1988 WL 91653, at *7.
Id.
Manthey, 468 N.W.2d 548.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id. at 550.
Id.
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Minnesota.”90 According to the court, “[t]his conduct alone demonstrates
[he] never intended to uproot himself from Minnesota.”91 Manthey suggests
that temporary employment in a new state weighs heavily against a
taxpayer’s claim that he has changed his domicile.
Permanent employment, on the other hand, has the opposite effect.
Permanent employment provides considerable support for a finding of
domicile in the state where that employment exists. In Morrissey II, the tax
court ruled in the taxpayer’s favor, concluding that he had established a new
domicile in Indiana.92 The court ruled in the taxpayer’s favor even though he
retained numerous ties to Minnesota, including family, medical, and
financial ties.93 The court reasoned that the taxpayer’s acceptance of a
permanent position in Indiana, which provided no chance of transfer back to
Minnesota, signified his intent to become an Indiana domiciliary.94 His
employment, along with his renting and furnishing of an apartment in
Indiana, was consistent with his intent to change domicile.95
Minnesota courts’ central focus on the nature of employment in a
state demonstrates the substantial weight placed on this factor in domicile
disputes. The significance placed on this factor is well-founded. The nature
of employment is a good indicator of a person’s intent either to remain
indefinitely in a state or to jump ship when their temporary employment runs
out. The nature of employment indicates whether a person is in a transient or
permanent position, which helps determine domicile. Therefore, the nature of
employment is placed among category-one factors.
C. Family, Social, Business, and Professional Ties
Minnesota courts’ treatment of family, social, business, and
professional ties has been inconsistent. In some cases, these ties carried great
weight, while in others, they carried less. In Page, the tax court noted that
“‘family, social and business ties are not easily nor quickly relinquished, nor
do they have to be to establish residence in another state.’”96 Page implicitly
suggests that less weight should be given to these associations. However, in
Sanchez, a case decided after Page, the tax court reminded: “[t]he Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that a taxpayer made an effective domicile change
from Minnesota to Florida only when he ‘established certain business, social,
political and religious associations in Florida and severed similar

90

Manthey, 468 N.W.2d at 550.
Id. (emphasis added).
92
Morrissey II, 1988 WL 91653, at *10.
93
Id. at *1, *3, *9.
94
Id. at *10.
95
Id.
96
Page, 1986 WL 15695, at *7 (quoting Truex v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 3246,
1982 WL 1509 (Minn. Tax Ct. Nov. 5, 1982)).
91
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relationships in Minnesota.’”97 This reminder came from Miller’s Estate v.
Commissioner of Taxation, a Minnesota Supreme Court case decided before
both Page and Sanchez.98 So these associations have apparently moved from
significant to the extent of potentially determinative in Miller’s Estate, to
receiving less significance in Page, to being significant again in Sanchez.99
The significance attached to these ties has been holding strong recently,
however, at least for family ties and professional services.
In Larson II, the Minnesota Supreme Court placed significant weight
on family ties, independent of the family-domicile presumption, and on
professional-service associations.100 The court, in upholding the tax court’s
decision that the taxpayer was domiciled in Minnesota rather than Nevada,
noted that the taxpayer had “no family living in Nevada during the tax years”
while “his sister, his three children, and his four grandchildren live[d] in
Minnesota and his youngest son attended school in Minnesota during the tax
years.”101 The court made no reference to the family-domicile
presumption.102 Rather, it saw these family ties as suggestive of the
taxpayer’s domicile under the factor analysis.
Larson II also placed substantial weight on professional services
hired by the taxpayer in Minnesota. While the taxpayer had an attorney and a
personal assistant in Nevada, he retained four Minnesota law firms and two
Minnesota accounting firms.103 He also retained a Minnesota personal
assistant who managed his bank accounts, paid his bills, and received his
mail.104 These professional connections weighed heavily against the
taxpayer’s claim that a new domicile had been established in Nevada.105
Currently, Minnesota courts seem to find certain ties, such as family
and professional-service associations, telling of a person’s domicile.
However, a domicile analysis is better served if these ties are not given
priority consideration. As the tax court noted in Page, family, social, and
97
Sanchez, 2008 WL 8679077, at *3 (emphasis added) (quoting Miller’s Estate v.
Comm’r of Taxation, 59 N.W.2d 925, 926 (Minn. 1953)).
98
Miller’s Estate, 59 N.W.2d at 926. This reminder, however, was misleading. In
Miller’s Estate, the Minnesota Supreme Court, while placing significant emphasis on the
taxpayer’s new associations in Florida and his severing of similar associations in Minnesota,
stated: “The fact that [the taxpayer] retained certain business connections in Minnesota may
be considered in determining the sincerity of his announced intent, but these circumstances do
not conclusively establish that he never changed his domicile from Minnesota to Florida.” Id.
at 927. This suggests a less significant emphasis on these connections, although more so than
the tax court appears to have given in Page. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
99
This lack of consistency in applying these factors, like the courts application of
other factors, may be a creature of the fact-intensive inquiry required in a domicile dispute.
Because of this fact-intensive inquiry, the ability to discuss these factors in isolation, or to
compare their application across cases, may be impaired.
100
Larson II, 824 N.W.2d 329.
101
Id. at 332.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See id.
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business ties are “not easily nor quickly relinquished, nor do they have to be
to establish residence in another state.’”106 While family is important, where
a taxpayer’s parents, siblings, and other relatives domicile should not carry
inordinate weight in an analysis of the taxpayer’s domicile.
Likewise, a taxpayer should not be punished for failing to sever ties
with his attorney and accountant—people with whom he has potentially
spent considerable time creating professional relationships. Trust is an
important aspect in these professional relationships and also in other business
relationships. Moreover, professional and business relationships are
compensated, which the Minnesota Tax Court has vaguely suggested
diminishes the importance of these factors in a domicile analysis.107
When it comes to social connections, what clubs a person joins may
suggest where a person considers “home,” but it should not carry excessive
weight in a domicile analysis. Like professional and business relationships,
relationships created in social organizations are developed over an extended
period and are not easily severed.
In sum, while family, social, business, and professional ties may
suggest a person’s domicile, they should not carry inordinate weight in a
domicile analysis. Therefore, in the proposed redraft, factors that deal with
family, social, business, and professional ties are relegated to category-two
factors. The one exception is for a spouse’s domicile. Unless the couple is
legally separated or the marriage has been dissolved, a spouse’s domicile
should weigh heavily on a court’s analysis, and therefore, a spouse’s
domicile is listed as a category-one factor.
D. Posturing Factors
The tax court has stated that certain factors are nothing more than
“posturing” factors. In Page, the tax court considered a taxpayer’s acts such
as “sending change of address cards to various credit card companies and
other creditors, closing their Minneapolis bank accounts, and relying solely
upon their Illinois bank accounts” as carrying little, if any, weight in a
domicile analysis.108 According to the court, “[t]o require such posturing in
order to effect a change of domicile would be absurd.”109 Page is not the
only example of Minnesota courts placing less weight on similar factors.
In Sanchez, even though all parties agreed that the couple never
intended to return to Minnesota, the couple still did not establish a new
domicile in South Dakota, despite having many factors connecting them to
106

Page, 1986 WL 15695, at *7 (citation omitted).
See Bradison v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 8286, 2012 WL 360461, at *10
(Minn. Tax Ct. Jan. 31, 2012) (rejecting a claim of Wyoming domicile by noting, in part, that
a connection to a Wyoming bank that was acting as a conservator carried less weight than
Minnesota connections, as the bank was being paid a reasonable fee for its services).
108
Page, 1986 WL 15695, at *9.
109
Id.
107
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South Dakota.110 The couple obtained a South Dakota mailing address and
South Dakota driver’s licenses.111 They opened checking accounts and
obtained credit cards in South Dakota.112 They also registered their vehicle in
South Dakota and registered to vote in the state.113 In addition, the couple
stated in an affidavit that they intended to return to South Dakota to rent or
buy a home after their travels, but did not do so initially to avoid the
expenses and obligations of home ownership.114 Those actions were not
enough for the court.
Page and Sanchez implicitly suggest that some factors—e.g.,
driver’s licenses, voter and vehicle registrations, and certain financial
connections—are qualitatively less important than others, such as living
quarters. In Sanchez, the court seemed skeptical of the domicile claim
because of the couple’s lack of physical presence in the state. While this
skepticism may have related more to the apparent failure of the husband and
wife to couple physical presence and intent, the court’s mention of this lack
of physical presence is telling. It suggests that a court views rental or
ownership of a residence as more revealing of a person’s domicile than the
state indicated on a person’s driver’s license or checking account.
Accordingly, the following factors are demoted to category three:
location of voter and vehicle registrations, address indicated on a driver’s
license, and location of bank accounts and similar financial accounts. While
mailing address was mentioned along with the other “posturing” factors, the
proposed redraft places it in category two. Mailing address, unlike the other
posturing factors, better signifies where a person believes their primary home
is located. A person needs to get their mail, which suggests they would direct
mail towards their primary residence. Similarly, where a person votes, unlike
simply registering to vote, better signifies where a person believes they are
domiciled. Voting in a state, especially in local elections, suggests a bond to
the state, more so than merely registering to vote.115 Therefore, where a
person votes is considered along with category-two factors.
E. Other State’s Tax Treatment of Income
Minnesota courts loathe any suggestion that a taxpayer’s apparent
desire to escape Minnesota’s income tax is a factor used in determining
intent. The Minnesota Supreme Court summed up this sentiment: “It is to be
110

Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d at 526; Sanchez, 2008 WL 8679077, at *2, *5.
Sanchez, 2008 WL 8679077, at *2.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Sanchez, 770 N.W.2d at 525.
115
For diversity jurisdiction, registration and voting may raise a presumption of
domicile, or they may be at least considered “weighty” factors. See 13E CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3612 (3d. ed. 2013). However, “with
residency requirements for voting registration greatly reduced as a result of certain Supreme
Court decisions, this factor may carry less weight in the future.” Id.
111
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pointed out that if the necessary intention to change one’s domicile is, in fact,
present, the motive or purpose in making the change [e.g., tax avoidance] is
unimportant.”116 This sentiment is unpracticed.
Minnesota courts have held it against taxpayers whom the courts
perceived as motivated by tax avoidance. In Manthey, the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld the tax court’s conclusion that a taxpayer had not
established a new domicile in Alaska.117 They did so even though the court
confessed that the facts presented a close case.118 In their opening fact
discussion, the court noted that before Alaska repealed their income tax, the
taxpayer had always filed Minnesota income tax returns, even though he
spent most of his time in Alaska.119 Then, after Alaska repealed its income
tax, the taxpayer stopped filing a Minnesota income tax return, because he
claimed Alaska as his domicile.120 This change of heart did not go unnoticed.
The court concluded that the timing of the taxpayer’s decision was relevant
to his intent, reasoning that “[t]he repeal of Alaska’s personal income tax law
. . . provide[d] a plausible explanation for [the taxpayer’s] motivations and
actions.”121 So while courts assert that a taxpayer’s motive to avoid
Minnesota’s income tax should not be considered when determining a
taxpayer’s intent, the courts’ actions suggest otherwise. Just as a taxpayer’s
acts should carry more weight than his declarations, so should a court’s.122
Moreover, considering which states habitually vie for a taxpayer’s
domicile affection, it becomes clear that a state’s tax treatment of income
plays an implicit role in domicile disputes. States without an income tax are
often involved in domicile disputes. Although there are only seven states that
impose no state income tax,123 these states are disproportionally at issue in
domicile disputes before Minnesota courts.124 This lopsided representation of
no-income-tax states highlights that tax treatment of income plays an implicit
role in domicile disputes.
Therefore, it’s time to allow the commissioner of revenue—and
courts—to explicitly take account of another state’s tax treatment of income.
116

Miller’s Estate, 59 N.W.2d at 926 n.1 (citations omitted).
Manthey, 468 N.W.2d at 550.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 549.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 550.
122
See MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2 (“No positive rule can be adopted with
respect to the evidence necessary to prove an intention to change a domicile but such intention
may be proved by acts and declarations, and of the two forms of evidence, acts must be given
more weight than declarations.”).
123
Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
Mike Sauter, Hate Paying Income Tax? Try These 7 States, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2013),
www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/03/23/states-income-tax/2002991/.
124
For example, nineteen Minnesota taxpayer cases were reviewed for this article.
Thirteen of those cases involved a claimed domicile in a no-income-tax state. Of the
remaining six, three involved a claimed foreign domicile. Thus, only three cases involved a
claimed domicile in a state that imposed a state income tax.
117

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2014

19

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 1

248

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:229

Accordingly, this article proposes adding a new factor to category one: other
state’s tax treatment of income. Allowing the commissioner and courts to
explicitly consider this factor will help them better determine if a taxpayer
really intended to establish a new domicile, as opposed to merely trying to
avoid state income tax.
V. A QUICK SUB-RULES SIDETRACK
While changes to the presumptions and factors are the focus of the
proposed redraft, many of the sub-rules can also be struck without damaging
the effectiveness of the redrafted rule. For example, the following portion of
Rule 8001.0300 is struck in the redraft:
A person who leaves home to go into another jurisdiction for
temporary purposes only is not considered to have lost that
person’s domicile. But if a person moves to another
jurisdiction with the intention of remaining there
permanently or for an indefinite time as a home, that person
has lost that person’s domicile in this state.125
This portion is nothing more than an application of the domicile
definition to a specific fact situation. It provides no additional guidance for a
court. Therefore, it is struck.126
Other sub-rules that are struck concern family ties.127 Because family
ties are sufficiently covered in the proposed redraft by category-one and
category-two factors, these sub-rules are struck. The redraft also strikes the
125

MINN. R. 8001.0300, subp. 2.
For similar reasons, the following sub-rules are also struck:
The mere intention to acquire a new domicile, without the fact of physical
removal, does not change the status of the taxpayer, nor does the fact of
physical removal, without the intention to remain, change the person’s
status.
126

An absence of intention to abandon a domicile is equivalent to an
intention to retain the existing one.
A person who is temporarily employed within this state does not acquire a
domicile in this state if during that period the person is domiciled outside
of this state.
Id.

127

The family-ties sub-rules that are struck state:
The domicile of a spouse is the same as the other spouse unless there is
affirmative evidence to the contrary or unless the husband and wife are
legally separated or the marriage has been dissolved. When a person has
made a home at any place with the intention of remaining there and the
person’s family neither lives there nor intends to do so, then that person
has established a domicile separate from that person’s family.
Id.
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sub-rule that states: “The domicile of a single person is that person’s usual
home.”128 This sub-rule adds nothing. At its core, a domicile analysis
attempts to identify a person’s “usual home.” But stating that fact does not
guide anyone in determining where a person is domiciled. Therefore, the
sub-rule is struck.
VI. A PATH FORWARD
The following is a proposed redraft of Minnesota Rule 8001.0300,
subparts 2 and 3—the subparts that relate directly to domicile. The redraft is
based on this article’s critique of the current rule. The goal is to trim the fat,
leaving a more principled, ordered rule.
Subp. 2. Domicile; definition, one domicile rule, and
presumption
The term “domicile” means the bodily presence of an
individual person in a place coupled with an intent to make
such a place one’s home. The domicile of any person is that
place in which that person’s habitation is fixed, without any
present intentions of removal therefrom, and to which,
whenever absent, that person intends to return.
An individual can have only one domicile at any particular
time.
A domicile once shown to exist is presumed to continue
until the contrary is shown. An intention to change a
domicile may be proved by acts and declarations, and of the
two forms of evidence, acts must be given more weight than
declarations. The domicile considerations in subpart 3 may
guide a court in its determination of intent.
Subp. 2a. Special domicile rules.
In a case of a minor child who is not emancipated, the
domicile of the child’s parents is the domicile of the child.
The domicile of the parent who has legal custody of the
child is the domicile of the child. A person who is a
permanent resident alien in the United States may have a
domicile in this state. The domicile of a member of the
armed forces will be governed by the facts just before
becoming a member of the armed forces.

128

Id.
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Subp. 3. Domicile Considerations; a hierarchical
approach.
With subpart 2 providing primary guidance, the following
process may be undertaken to help determine where a person
is domiciled. The process requires a step-by-step approach
through a hierarchy of factors, divided into three categories.
Category-one factors must be given the most weight and are
considered first. If a domicile can be identified based on
category-one factors, that place is the person’s domicile. If
not, category-two factors should be considered. If a
determination still cannot be made, category-three factors
should be considered. If necessary, other factors that are
indicative of the person’s domicile may be considered along
with category-three factors. A determination must ultimately
be made after consideration of all three categories.
Category one:
A. Location of domicile for prior years;
B. Classification of employment as temporary or
permanent;
C. Location of employment;
D. Location of newly acquired living quarters
whether owned or rented;
E. Present status of the former living quarters, i.e.,
whether it was sold, offered for sale, rented, or
available for rent to another;
F. Whether homestead status has been requested
and/or obtained for property tax purposes on
newly purchased living quarters and whether the
homestead status of the former living quarters
has not been renewed;
G. Percentage of time (not counting hours of
employment) that the person is physically
present in Minnesota and the percentage of time
(not counting hours of employment) that the
person is physically present in each jurisdiction
other than Minnesota;
H. Location
of
jurisdiction
from
which
unemployment compensation benefits are
received;
I. Where the person’s spouse is domiciled, but
only if the couple is not legally separated or the
marriage has not been dissolved;
J. Other state’s tax treatment of income.
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Category two:
A. Where the person legally votes;
B. Status as a student;
C. Ownership of other real property;
D. Jurisdiction from which any professional
licenses were issued;
E. Location of the person’s union membership;
F. Physical location of the vehicles;
G. Location of business relationships and the place
where business is transacted;
H. Location of social, fraternal, or athletic
organizations or clubs or in a lodge or country
club, in which the person is a member;
I. Address where mail is received;
J. Location of schools at which the person or the
person’s spouse or children attend, and whether
resident or nonresident tuition was charged;
K. Where the person’s family, other than their
spouse, is domiciled;
L. Statements made to an insurance company,
concerning the person’s residence, and on which
the insurance is based.
Category three:
A. Where the person is registered to vote;
B. Jurisdiction in which a valid driver’s license was
issued;
C. Where the person’s vehicle is registered;
D. Whether an income tax return has been filed as a
resident or nonresident;
E. Whether the person has fulfilled the tax
obligations required of a resident;
F. Whether resident or nonresident fishing or
hunting licenses were purchased;
G. Location of any bank accounts, especially the
location of the most active checking account;
H. Location of other transactions with financial
institutions;
I. Location of the place of worship at which the
person is a member;
J. Charitable contributions made by a person.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A state that depends on overlapping presumptions, sub-rules, and
factors to resolve a domicile dispute should expect unprincipled results.
When everything matters, nothing matters. This article’s proposed redraft
will not ensure perfectly predictable results—domicile disputes are often
unpredictable. But the redraft at least brings to the forefront factors that
better signify a person’s domicile, while trimming unnecessary presumptions
and sub-rules. As it currently stands, Minnesota’s application of Rule
8001.0300 in domicile disputes is unprincipled. This needs to change.
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